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The EcoS provides at least three distinct, yet interconnected, functionssupply depot, waste repository, and living space-for human societies (Dunlap, 1994; Dunlap, Michelson, & Stalker, 2002) . The EcoS, functioning as a "supply depot," provides raw resources or inputs into agricultural and industrial production processes (Dunlap et al., 2002) . Overuse of the EcoS as supply depot occurs when nonrenewable resources are depleted and renewable resources are used faster than the rate in which they are replenished by natural processes (Meadows, Meadows, & Rander, 1992; Picou & Marshall, 2002) .
As a "waste repository," the EcoS absorbs the waste produced by human activity (Dunlap et al., 2002) . Additions to the environment take the form of pollution when toxic chemicals (typically, the negative by-products of production processes) are released at rates too fast for the earth's natural processes to absorb and break down (Meadows et al., 1992; Picou & Marshall, 2002) . Deregulationor, at best, discretionary enforcement of existing environmental regulations-has allowed corporations to externalize the environmental and social costs of pollution (Cable & Cable, 1995; Marshall, 1999) . Thus, the public indirectly, and often unknowingly, subsidizes the polluting corporation by either withstanding the health costs of living in a degraded environment or paying for environmental restoration (Cable & Cable, 1995) . 1 As nonrenewable resources are depleted, renewable resources are used at unsustainable rates, and pollution is generated on a scale that the earth can't absorb, the "living space" function of the EcoS is severely attenuated. Lester Brown (2003) provided evidence that water tables are falling, rivers are running dry, freshwater aquifers are being depleted, productive top soil is being blown away, deserts are advancing, temperatures are rising, snow and/or ice masses in the mountains are melting, and oceans are rising. Given these trends, he contended that the modern world is becoming a "civilization in trouble" precariously living on a "planet under stress" (Brown, 2003) . Indisputably, the impacts of these trends are not distributed evenly, with people who are low income in developed nations and people in developing nations often living in the trenches, bearing the brunt of a stressed planet (Marshall, 1999) . However, because these trends are global and interconnected, it is also clear that everyone on earth will be affected. At the cost of sounding apocalyptic, worst-case ecological crises are crises of living space that, if severe enough, poses a threat to survival. Habermas (1973) stated that in "differentiated societies, the political system (as a separate control center) assumes a superordinate position vis-a-vis the sociocultural and economic systems" (p. 5). The central role of the PAS is fully developed in J. O'Connor's (1973) "fiscal crisis of the state" thesis. In liberal democratic nations, the "state must fulfill two basic and often conflicting functionsaccumulation and legitimization" (J. O'Connor, p. 6). Conditions conducive to capital accumulation are advanced via the accumulation function (liberalism) of the PAS because failure to do so undermines "the source of its own power, the taxes drawn from the economy's surplus production" (J. O'Connor, p. 6). Conversely, the flagrant use of coercive force that enables one class to accumulate capital at the expense of other classes attenuates the legitimacy of the state, undermining the basis of its political support (democracy). Considering Schnaiberg's (1980) thesis that society is on a "treadmill of production," involving the perpetually growing needs of capital investment and profitability that require increasing inputs of energy and material, pressure on the state to fulfill its accumulation function is pervasive.
ROLE OF THE STATE
The globalization of the EconS has intensified the fiscal crisis of the state (Marshall, 1999) .
2 With the potency and expanse of global capitalism, the relative power of transnational corporations has increased, and the relative power of governments within nation-states has decreased (Marshall, 1999; Robinson, 1996) . Given this power shift, transnational corporations have effectively pressured liberal democratic states to adopt neo-liberal policies, thus creating conditions conducive for capital accumulation. As such, the state's ability to fulfill its legitimation function is weakened, as it is less able to regulate economic activity within national boundaries, to capture and redistribute surpluses, and to impose regulations on polluting corporations. At the same time, the state has fulfilled its accumulation function by providing corporate subsidies and tax breaks, dismantling environmental regulations, and managing publicly owned natural resources mostly for commodity production (Marshall, 2001) . The ability to steer around legitimation crises depends on the adaptability of the state. Offe (1984) understood that crisis management itself periodically enters crisis; however, he was not deterministic about either the likelihood of system failure or adaptability. Although J. O'Connor (1988 O'Connor ( , 1998 was aware of the adaptability of capitalism, he viewed this as either a self-destruction or subversion of capitalism. With his focus on the self-destructive tendencies of capitalism, J. O'Connor (1998) underestimated the long-term ability of the PAS to manage crises. He also was more dismissive of the Keynesian social welfare state with its flip side of neo-classical laissez-faire policies (J. O'Connor, 1991; see also M. O'Connor, 1991) . He did not see regulation and deregulation as being two sides of the same coin that represent steering the system left and right in an effort to avoid crisis. We argue that the PAS is more innovative and adaptable in managing crises than J. O'Connor (1988 O'Connor ( , 1998 allowed.
CRISES AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Some imperatives of the EconS and SCS are internal to these respective systems, whereas other imperatives begin externally in the EcoS. The PAS must serve the system imperatives of the economic and SCSs by managing, or avoiding steering problems associated with, all three systems. Because the system imperatives of the EconS and SCS are inherently contradictory, steering problems and associated system crises are persistent features of "late capitalist" societies (Habermas, 1973) . According to Habermas (1973) , rationality (output) crises result when the PAS is not able to effectively steer the EconS. We disagree with Habermas, instead arguing that thus far all crises have been rationality crises that originate with ineffective, or temporarily effective, policy decisions (output) by the PAS. Policy changes initiate a process that may lead to a crisis, the effects of which flow back to the PAS as steering problems. We presented this argument in Figure 1 and more fully develop it below. The concepts and relationships in Figure 1 were drawn from the systems theory of Habermas (p. 5) and the fiscal crisis of the state thesis of J. O'Connor (1973) .
Although capitalism is inherently crisis prone because of contradictions, it is also crisis dependent; as long as crises can be managed, they create investment opportunities. Thus, according to J. O'Connor (1998), "capital accumulates through crisis" (p. 163). Crisis results in a restructuring of the system into more rational forms to deal with that crisis (J. O'Connor, 1998) . Based on earlier work described above and our argument for treating the EcoS as semiautonomous, we've identified four crises-accumulation crisis of overproduction, accumulation crisis of underproduction, social welfare legitimation crisis, and environmental legitimation crisis. Because of the superordinate role of the PAS in late capitalist societies, we contend, despite the claims made in early research on systemic crises, that the four crises discussed below begin (as policy change or inaction) and end (as steering problems) within the PAS (represented by letters A, B, C, and D in Figure 1 ).
Accumulation Crisis of Overproduction (Process A1 → → A2)
What we are calling the accumulation crisis of overproduction is the first contradiction of capitalism (Marx, 1977) . As originally formulated, the first contradiction is internal to the EconS, rooted in the exploitation of labor by capital, and leads to a realization crisis (Leff, 1992) . Because the worker produces more value than he or she is paid in wages, an economic crisis emerges because of overproduction and underconsumption (Leff, 1992) . We suggest that the self-destruction of capitalism because of the first contradiction is unlikely for two reasons. First, reducing wages to a point in which workers can't afford the products they produce is less critical with the widespread embrace of a neo-liberal agenda that eases the transnational flow of goods. In other words, overproduction would not lead to a realization crisis as long as there is a global market for the goods being produced. Second, the argument that this crisis is internal to the EconS is only valid if one argues that the EconS is autonomous. This argument may have been cogent prior to the emergence of late capitalism; however, clearly the EconS is not autonomous today, and the relations between capital and labor are influenced by the PAS. For example, the PAS may undermine its accumulation function by increasing the minimum wage that, in turn, would lessen corporate profit and fiscal skim-off by the PAS (process A1 → A2). The PAS may steer around a potential The theoretical inclusion of ecological constraints as a central feature within political economic models matured with the publication of J. O'Connor's (1991) thesis on the "second contradiction of capitalism" (SCC). This thesis has triggered much thought and debate. 3 The SCC is external to the EconS, based on the limitations imposed by natural resources and leads to a liquidity crisis caused by underproduction (Foster, 1992; J. O'Connor, 1998) . Central to the SCC thesis is what Marx called the "conditions of production," that includes: first, human labor power or "personal conditions of production"; second, the environment or natural conditions of production; and third, urban infrastructure and space (Toledo, 1991, p. 1) .
The SCC, which causes "the self-destruction of capital's conditions of production," generates a crisis of underproduction (Leff, 1992, p. 2) . According to the SCC thesis, the role of the state is central as it regulates the "three conditions of production which cannot be produced as commodities and hence cannot be provided by capital" (Kabra, 1992, p. 2) . 4 With apocalyptic overtones, Leff (1992) stated that "a generalized ecological crisis, induced by capital accumulation, can bring about a catastrophic crisis of the economic system with far greater consequences than any other previous form of capitalist destructive creation" (p. 5).
The SCC thesis narrowly specifies the EcoS solely as a supply depot, as a source of raw materials for use in production processes, which is only one of the three functions of the EcoS. As such, the only type of environmental degradation that would trigger an accumulation crisis is the unsustainable use of natural resources. Although the environment is typically treated as an economic resource, it cannot be reduced to its economic value. There is also an aesthetic aspect to the environment that is based on a set of values that is not reducible to formal, instrumental, or purposive rationality. We propose that decisions regarding the environment need to be based partially on a set of substantive values, not reducible to its economic components (M. Weber, 1978) . In short, J. O'Connor's (1991) SCC thesis reduces the environment to its role in capital accumulation, when it needs to be seen in a broader context as conditions of communal and coevolutionary human development.
From a broader perspective, there is a dialectical relationship between human beings and nature as first articulated by Marx and highlighted by Foster's (1999) article on the metabolic rift. Humans are part of nature; however, through their labor they expropriate natural resources and transform them into commodities. The insatiable appetite of capitalist economic production leads to rifts in the natural organism that, in turn, causes rifts in the social organism and vice versa (Foster, 1999) . This has also been referred to as a dialectic between the organic and the inorganic (Foster & Burkett, 2000) . Parallel to this use of the concept metabolism, when the PAS deregulates or weakens environmental policies, this enables the EconS to undermine the EcoS's ability to function as a supply depot and waste repository. This not only creates an accumulation crisis of underproduction and thus a steering problem for the PAS but also could lead to an ecological crisis of living space.
Obviously, as a dynamic, semiautonomous system, the EcoS changes over time independent of PAS's policies and human activity. However, ecological Marshall, Goldstein / ENVIRONMENTAL LEGITIMATION CRISIS 219 change that has the most direct effect on the EconS and SCS in the late capitalist era is anthropogenic and rooted in policy changes by the PAS (process B1 → B2 → B3). For example, the U.S. Forest Service (PAS) may open up public lands for selective harvesting to lessen the spread of forest fires. This land now serves as a supply depot, providing free timber for logging companies that, in turn, increase profits and fiscal skim-off.
Social Welfare Legitimation Crisis (Process C1 → → C2)
A legitimation (input) crisis arises when the SCS withdraws mass loyalty from the PAS. The social welfare legitimation crisis occurs when the PAS fails to maintain mass loyalty by not redistributing an expected amount of the surplus value through social welfare expenditures (Habermas, 1973) . To steer around this problem, the PAS could increase social welfare expenditures or public services that, in turn, would increase mass loyalty (process C1 → C2). Economic crises stemming from the first and second contradictions of capitalism and the social welfare legitimation crisis have been identified and described at length by earlier researchers. We extend this work by delineating a second type of legitimation crisis, one that arises when the PAS is perceived as not managing the EcoS in accordance with the interests of the public or particular communities.
Environmental Legitimation Crisis (Process D1 → → D2 → → D3)
As certain segments of the population disproportionately face problems associated with pollution and resource depletion, and as the nation's publicly owned lands and waters are plundered mostly for private economic gain (Behan, 2001) , the PAS's failure to fulfill its legitimation function is revealed. This revelation by an already-apathetic citizenry has increased the distrust of governmental agencies. Citizens come to view particular agencies as "recreant-that is, institutional actors are perceived as having failed to carry out their responsibilities with the vigor necessary to merit the societal trust they covet (Beamish, 2001; Freudenburg, 1993) . Another source of recreancy occurs when the regulatory process is subverted through "agency capture"-when the views of a regulatory agency are more closely aligned with the industry it is supposed to regulate than with the interests of the public (Davidson & Frickel, 2004; Freudenburg & Gramling, 1994) . Finally, with the proliferation of contaminated communities (or, recent awareness that they exist) in the United States, grassroots environmental movements-for example, NIMBY (not in my backyard) and environmental justice movementshave emerged as a relatively potent force (Marshall, 1999) . We suggest that recreancy, agency capture, and the grassroots environmental movement are grounded expressions of the government's legitimation crisis (Marshall, 2001) .
In an effort to stave off an environmental legitimation crisis, the PAS could clean up toxic chemicals in contaminated communities, which would restore the EcoS as a living space (noncommodity use) and lessen the likelihood of health problems (process D1 → D2 → D3). As another example, the PAS could buy private land from a timber company to create mountain biking trails, which would shift land from extractive economic uses to less intensive, recreational uses (process D1 → D2 → D3). Finally, the PAS could set aside land covered by old-growth forests as a wilderness area, which would enable the forest to continue to provide the ecological services of cleaning the air, slowing stormwater runoff, and providing habitat for a plethora of wildlife (process D1 → D2 → D3).
How does the state attempt to fulfill its legitimation function in an era of powerful transnational corporations, vast social inequalities, and a distrustful and apathetic citizenry? In the next section, we assess the empirical import of the CSM by examining the evolving role of citizen participation in natural resource management. We also illustrate the adaptability of the PAS in an effort to avoid an environmental legitimation crisis. These relationships are summarized and depicted in the NRMSM. Historically, federal public lands and waters have been managed by natural resource agencies in accordance with its accumulation function, not its legitimation function. Arguably, this imbalance led to a looming environmental legitimation crisis in the 1960s and then again in the late 1980s. We suggest, along with others, that the recent trend of promoting more public participation in environmental decision making partially reflects an attempt by natural resource agencies to regain citizen trust and avoid an environmental legitimation crisis (Cupps, 1977; Rosener, 1982 ; J. Thomas, 1990; Tuler & Webler, 1999) . Put differently, increasing citizen involvement can be viewed as a means for resource agencies to prevent, or at least delay, a crisis of legitimacy.
NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
The substance of environmental legislation and statutes, natural resource agency philosophies, mission statements, and resource management practices elucidate how societies, communities, and individuals view their relationship with the environment. As such, natural resource agencies are embedded in a broader social context, and public lands managers serve as more than just stewards of land but also as individuals charged with maintaining the ongoing relationship between the environment and society. The contours of this relationship are created and re-created as society changes. Momentous change challenges the adaptability or flexibility of natural resource agencies that must reinvent themselves by adjusting their organizational structure and culture, management style, and practice to maintain itself as a legitimate social institution. We provide a brief historical sketch of efforts by natural resource agencies to strike a balance between fulfilling its accumulation and legitimation functions. In our discussion of natural resource management, we outline the relationships between natural resources agencies, which belong to the PAS, resource-dependent industries, which belong to the EconS, public lands and waters, which belong to the EcoS, and citizen stakeholders, which belong to the SCS. These relationships are depicted in Figure 2 . The relationships between the systems are somewhat self-explanatory with a few exceptions. The SCS has an impact on the EcoS through the influence of numerous environmental groups that have different agendas. As one of the tenets of ecosystem-based approaches, citizen stakeholders have an influence on the management of public lands and waters through environmental decision making.
Accumulation Function
From colonial times to the 1860s, referred to as the "acquisition era," a balance of power between the original 13 colonies was threatened because of conflict and competition over western territories (Laitos & Carr, 1999) . As a result, the U.S. Constitution gave newly acquired territories (through purchases, annexations, and treaties) to the federal government rather than to individual states (Laitos & Carr, 1999) . During the "disposal era," the federal government encouraged the development of the West by transferring land to farmers through various homestead acts and to railroads as inducements to build tracks westward (Laitos & Carr, 1999) . The conservation movement emerged in the late 19th century in response to the unchecked destruction of the nation's natural resources by rapid industrialization. With a new conservation ethic and a growing consensus that federal government should reduce the transfer of federal land to private hands, we see the roots of the traditional natural resource management era (Laitos & Carr, 1999) .
Consisting of approximately one third of the United States's entire land base, federal public lands were managed according to the utilitarian concept of "sustained yield" (Anderson, 1995) and the philosophy of "multiple use" management (Laitos & Carr, 1999) . The concept of sustained yield is based on the assumption that continuous production can be maintained through scientific planning and management (Anderson, 1995) . Multiple use implies that multiple activities can be carried out simultaneously on federal public lands (Smith, 1995) . Despite continued procedural adherence to the philosophy of multiple-use, resource agencies narrowly managed public lands from the early 1900s until the late 1960s to maximize the sustained yield of a single, market-oriented resource: the Forest Service managed for timber production (Brunson & Kennedy, 1995; Cortner & Moote, 1999; Keiter, 1994; Laitos & Carr, 1999) , the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) managed forage for cattle and sheep grazing (Brunson & Kennedy, 1995; Cortner & Moote, 1999; Keiter, 1994; Laitos & Carr, 1999) , the National Park Service (NPS) managed to enhance visitor usage (Cortner & Moote, 1999) , and the Bureau of Reclamation managed to maintain water supply for farm irrigation (Cortner & Moote, 1999; Laitos & Carr, 1999) . Thus, federal lands, publicly owned and funded by taxpayer dollars, were being plundered for the purposes of private gain (Behan, 2001) .
The direct process used by the PAS (process A1 → A2) to fulfill its accumulation function is not available to natural resource agencies. Rather, natural resources agencies, prior to the 1960s, indirectly fulfilled its accumulation function by managing public lands and waters, as discussed above, to develop marketoriented resources (process B1 → B2 → B3). For instance, the BLM would grant cattle ranchers access to public lands to provide food for cattle at no (or a nominal) cost, which increases profits and fiscal skim-off.
Natural resource scientists and managers developed close alliances with the extractive industries that were dependent on federal public lands and waters (Knight & Bates, 1995) . "This 'capture' of multiple use agencies," according to Laitos and Carr (1999) , "is due in part to the broad authority afforded public lands managers, the courts' refusal to overturn exercises of agency discretion that make commodity uses a preferred multiple use, and relentless pressure by mining, timber, and stockman's interest" (p. 212). The failure of multiple use statutes to provide clear standards that constrained the discretion of federal managers (Smith, 1995) , the fact that public lands were managed mostly for economic value (Smith, 1995) , and an overly close relationship between resource agencies and extractive industries (Knight & Bates, 1995) set the stage for the delegitimation of natural resource agencies and stronger citizen demands for management for noncommodity uses.
Those agencies of the PAS (e.g., the BLM and Forest Service) who had a historically entrenched relationship with extractive industries and managed land for commodity production were reticent to accommodate citizen demands (Brunson & Kennedy, 1995) . Conversely, because of a historical focus on managing land for recreation and wildlife habitats, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and NPS were better positioned to allay citizen demand for noncommodity uses (Brunson & Kennedy, 1995) . Recreational use of public lands increased dramatically throughout the past several decades, and all agencies have greatly expanded the percentage of land used for recreation and/or preservation (Laitos & Carr, 1999) . Thus, the historically close relationship between resource agencies (PAS) and extractive industries (EconS) deteriorated. Laitos and Carr (1999) concluded that resource use conflicts of the 21st century will not be between the traditional battles of extractive industries versus environmentalists, but rather between recreationists versus preservationists.
The shift toward managing more of the public lands and waters for recreational purposes doesn't necessarily change the process through which natural resource agencies fulfill their accumulation function (B1 → B2 → B3), but which industries benefit does change. For example, Laitos and Carr (1999) showed, through a costbenefit analysis, that managing for recreation and preservation is more economically efficient than a taxpayer-subsidized, federal system that managed for resource extraction for capital accumulation. In the late 1990s, outdoor recreation generated hundreds of billions of dollars annually, surpassing timber harvesting, grazing, and mining as the economic force on western public lands (Laitos & Carr, 1999) .
Despite the strongly worded mandates coming out of the 1970s legislation, considered the "golden age" of public lands legislation, some regional natural resource agencies rejected land use trends through continued adherence to the antiquated, market-oriented bias of resource extraction (DeBonis, 1995). As such, balancing the interests of the extractive industries, recreationalists, and preservationists in such a way that enables resource agencies to fulfill its accumulation and legitimation functions is the challenge of the 21st century.
Legitimation Function
To understand how natural resource agencies (PAS) have maintained legitimacy, it is useful to identify three historical periods-the scientific expertise era, National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) participation era, and collaborative decision-making era. Citizen participation takes many forms and has many different definitions. Yet, most generally, citizen participation is any "purposeful activity in which citizens take part in relation to government" (Langton, 1978, p. 17) . We expand this definition by making the distinction between authentic or inauthentic participation, described below as ideal types. With a focus on process and outcome, authentic participation means that citizen stakeholders are a part of the deliberation process, from issue framing to policy implementation (King, Feltey, & Susel, 1998) . Thus, participation is authentic when the public has a genuine opportunity to influence decision making at all stages of the process. Inauthentic participation occurs when public input is solicited; however, the agency never intends to seriously use the input. Another way to express this is in formal or substantive terms. Inauthentic participation follows the form without having the substance whereas authentic participation is of substance. We suggest participation that is somewhat authentic is necessary for resources agencies to garner citizen trust and regain institutional legitimacy. More broadly, no public input or inauthentic participation in environmental decision making leads to a metabolic rift in the social and natural organism, whereas authentic participation reconnects the SCS and EcoS.
The scientific expertise era. The "expertise era" began at the end of the 20th century and ended with the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969. Citizens did not participate in environmental decision making during the expertise era, as natural resource agencies and agents of the PAS maintained their legitimacy as reservoirs of expertise and decisions were made by a relatively small number of highly centralized managers and scientists. This topdown process of decision making omitted any meaningful inclusion of stakeholder or citizen input. Resource agencies were thought to produce objective knowledge through scientific expertise and discounted the public as nonexperts and lay knowledge as value laden. Scientists publicly opted for a role of value neutrality, and scientific research was based on a reductionistic, linear, and mechanistic model of the empirical world.
The public generally supported scientists' claims of expertise and the belief that science was a superior knowledge system with canons of proof producing findings untainted by personality, politics, and commercialism. Legitimate human knowledge and environmental decision making was built largely on trust in expert systems located in institutions, including natural resource agencies. As presented in Figure 2 , natural resource agencies fulfilled their legitimation function (process C1 → C2), not necessarily by how they actually managed natural resources but rather by relying on the legitimacy and exalted status that most scientific experts enjoyed during this era.
Beginning in the 1960s, critics of traditional science argued that scientists are (and were) not objective, science is not value free, research may be politicized, large-scale research organizations have become financially tied to commercial interests, and lay knowledge should be valued in decision making. The decline of the expertise era in natural resource management coincided with a broader critique of science more generally. Managing public lands solely for the extractive industries in the face of increased citizen demands for outdoor recreation opportunities, may result in a legitimation crisis. Resource agencies responded by weakening ties with extractive industries, increasing recreational opportunities, and democratizing environmental decision making.
The NEPA participation era. The most common model of public participation in resource management is the public "hearing" or "forum." This form of participation was first institutionalized by NEPA and has been the staple of natural resource management. National Environmental Policy Act proclaims that "each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment" (Spyke, 1999, p. 278) . For instance, federal agencies must prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for each major federal project in which the impacts of the project on water pollution, wildlife, land use, wetlands protection, and flood control are described in detail (McGregor, 1994; Spyke, 1999) . Environmental Impact Statements must be published in the Federal Register for public review. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) was established under NEPA to carry out the functions of the statute. Council on Environmental Quality regulations stress public involvement in the implementation of NEPA through notice and comment procedures that are mandated in the NEPA process. The procedural requirements for public participation are enforced by federal courts, and opponents can file suits to challenge NEPA decisions and EISs (McGregor, 1994) .
A weakness of this model of participation is that most agencies require only minimal public input in the Environmental Analysis (Spyke, 1999) , a preliminary report that determines if federal actions require a full EIS (McGregor, 1994) . Most federal actions do not require a full EIS. Some argue that the Environmental Analysis is an alternative process to the EIS that enables agencies to circumvent full NEPA compliance, thus averting any meaningful public participation in the decision-making process (Spyke, 1999) . Despite NEPA's commitment to public involvement, critics note many problems: NEPA-related documents are overly technical; public involvement is sought after agency decisions have been made; and agencies do a poor job of locating appropriate stakeholders (Council on Environmental Quality, 1997). Traditional public hearings are ineffective and adversarial because input is sought too late in the process, after issues have been framed and most decisions have been made (Hadden, 1989; King et al., 1998) . Furthermore, only a very small portion of the population has an opportunity to speak at public hearings that are primarily held to fulfill legal requirements rather than to stimulate authentic public input (Hadden, 1989) . Some argued that public hearings are not democratic because participants are better educated, more politically active, and more informed than nonparticipants (Godschalk & Stiftle, 1981) .
In addition, public hearings tend to foster participation by interest groups while limiting participation by the general public (Cortner & Moote, 1999) , and other interests are typically muted by economic interests (Checkoway, 1981; Checkoway & Van Til, 1978; Godschalk & Stifle, 1981) . Low attendance at public hearings is often interpreted, by default, as support for the status quo or public apathy (Kathlene & Martin, 1991) . However, a different interpretation is plausible. If citizens presume that their input will not affect policy choices, what is the incentive to participate? Despite the aforementioned problems with NEPA, the Act created a process that institutionalized the inclusion of citizen input in agency decision making (Adler, 1995; Machlis, 1999) . Although NEPA is substantively weak, "it has become a powerful law of environmental process on the public domain" (Keiter, 1990, p. 59) .
In sum, at the end of the scientific expert era, people began to question the legitimacy of resource agencies as reservoirs of expertise, thus necessitating the search by resource agencies for new avenues of regaining and maintaining legitimacy. Citizen participation, a cornerstone of democracy, seemed to be a plausible avenue, especially considering that resource agency employees are not democratically elected. Although NEPA was an important step toward a more participatory form of resource management, ultimately it failed because citizen input was treated by resource agencies as symbolic and inauthentic rather than real and authentic. By the l980s, resource agencies had to adapt or evolve to avoid a crisis of legitimacy, but in a much harsher climate. On a broader level, the public was increasingly more distrustful of government and other institutions.
Trust in government often is specified as a measure of some aspect of the broader concept of political legitimacy (Erikson, Luttbeg, & Tedin, 1991) . C. Thomas (1998) suggested that trust in government should be viewed as existing on a continuum:
The more we calculate the intentions of others, expect something in return, and subsequently monitor their performance, the less we are exhibiting trust. Similarly, the more others take our interests into account, putting their own interests aside in the process, the more they are worthy of our trust. (p. 170) The public's trust in government has, on average, decreased in the United States since the 1960s (Lipset & Schneider, 1983; A. Miller, 1974) . Although trust in government began to rise in 1982, reaching a minor peak in 1986, it subsequently declined during the 1990s, hitting its lowest point in 1994. On a broader level, the decline in confidence in major institutions during the past 30 years is significant (Nye, Zelikow, & King, 1997) .
As the negative impact of technology on the environment became increasingly apparent, the public's trust of science declined further (Edelstein, 1988; Flynn, Burns, Mertz, & Slovic, 1992; Freudenburg & Steinspar, 1991; Greenberg & Williams, 1999; S. Miller, Rein, & Levitt, 1990; Piller, 1991) . Public skepticism of science is also manifest in the public endorsement of traditional environmental knowledge (Holton, 1993) and other nonscientific epistemologies (Picou & Marshall, 2002) . In addition, confidence in institutions responsible for regulation and management of environmental risks has eroded steadily throughout the past several decades (Dunlap & Mertig, 1992; Lipset & Schneider, 1983) . A number of studies provide evidence of a relationship between low levels of trust in institutions and high levels of expressed environmental concern (Freudenburg, 1993; Hoban & Woodrum, 1992; Marshall, 1995; Slovic, 1992) .
As presented in Figure 2 , natural resource agencies strived to fulfill their legitimation function by changing their relationship with citizen stakeholders by democratizing (C1 → C2) agency decision making. Trust in natural resource agencies may have initially increased even though citizen involvement was mostly inauthentic (formal, not substantive), having little effect on outcome-how public lands and waters are actually managed. With a public more aware of problems related to resource depletion and pollution, coupled with the broader trends of decreasing citizen trust of science and government, natural resource agencies responded by adopting a new resource management paradigm and a more-participatory, collaborative decision-making model. The role of citizen participation in the new ecosystem-based approaches is much greater and articulated as more authentic than in traditional strategies.
Collaborative decision making. Beginning in the 1990s, virtually all federal, state, and local natural resource agencies have reinvented themselves by adopting, often viewed as a paradigm shift, an ecosystem-based approach (Cortner & Moote, 1999) . The transition toward greater grassroots citizen participation in environmental policy is partially influenced by a larger "reinventing government" movement, in which agencies have recognized the limitations of top-down regulatory models of environmental protection (E. Weber, 1999) . For instance, natural resource agencies are advocating a different form of citizen participation, one in which citizens mobilize proactively in a long-term, collective effort to protect the local environment and prevent the emergence of environmental problems. Ecosystem-based approaches are designed to promote greater stakeholder involvement in environmental decision making, policy design, and implementation through interactive collaboration, open communication, shared leadership, and new partnerships. It provides local communities greater involvement in decisions that affect their community and allows a plethora of community concerns to be incorporated into decision making about environmental issues.
The primary stated purpose of including citizen involvement in ecosystem management is to improve the effectiveness of management. However, somewhat independent of management outcomes, secondary benefits may be accrued by participants and communities. For instance, authentic participation is lauded as a method to empower communities (Fiorino, 1989; Spyke, 1999) , create community leaders (Spyke, 1999) , and redistribute power (Kweit & Kweit, 1981) . With community empowerment is a greater sense of individual efficacy as citizens begin to see their efforts as part of a greater whole. In short, authentic participation is thought to produce an engaged citizenry who may become part of an extended peer community that not only manages extant environmental problems but also reduces the proliferation of new problems and, therefore, steers around a potential ecological crisis.
For citizen participation to be effective, citizen participants and resource managers must develop new understandings of their roles in decision making. From in-depth interviews, King et al. (1998) depicted the dilemmas that emerge when managers and citizens attempt to redefine their roles in environmental decision making. Although managers recognize the need for more citizen participation, they are unable to find ways to fit the public into decision-making processes. Although citizens agree that more participation is needed, they are cynical about the impact of their involvement because of prior experiences with agencies requesting input merely for symbolic reasons.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Prior to the passage of NEPA in 1969, natural resource agencies fulfilled their accumulation function by managing public lands for market-oriented resources, while symbolically fulfilling their legitimation function via the authority given to agencies by Congress as scientific and technical experts. Lay knowledge and public input was invalid because it was not expert knowledge. As the exalted status of science and scientists waned because of the increasing degradation of the environment, so did the legitimacy of natural resource agencies. Beginning with the enactment of NEPA, we argue that the evolution of citizen involvement in natural resource management partially reflects an adaptive response by natural resource agencies to address a legitimation crisis. At the beginning of the NEPA participation era, the formal democratization of the process, independent of outcome (how public lands and waters are actually managed), enabled resource agencies to increase trust in government or, at least, delay an environmental legitimation crisis. When citizens realized that NEPA participation is inauthentic, that the process (C1 → C2) is disconnected from management decisions (B1) the legitimacy gained by resource agencies began to dissipate. In the 1980s, we saw the transition from traditional resource management to ecosystem-based approaches, the latter including a much-increased role for the public in decision making.
Although there are other valid reasons for adopting an ecosystem-based approach (Marshall, 2001) , we contend that the inclusion of collaborative decision making is another adaptive response by natural resource agencies. Because collaborative decision making and ecosystem management is relatively new, evidence assessing its effectiveness is limited. In the short-term, if collaborative decision making is treated inauthentically, then the process becomes the same as NEPA participation (C1 → C2) with only a temporary increase in trust in government. Collaborative decision making is simply old wine in new bottles. If, however, collaborative decision making is treated authentically, then natural resource agencies and citizen stakeholders together are involved in a much different process (D1 → D2 → D3 → D4) that weakens the direct management (B1) of public lands and waters by natural resource agencies. We argue that for natural resource agencies to stave off an environmental legitimation crisis over the long-run, they must treat collaborative decision making authentically.
Specifically, natural resource agencies must fulfill their legitimation function through democratic processes (D1), which includes citizen stakeholders in environmental decision making (D2). In turn, the management of public lands and waters is changed (D3) to reflect the interests of citizen stakeholders, which increases their trust (D4) in natural resource agencies. Whether or not collaborative decision making is treated inauthentically (C1 → C2) or authentically (D1 → D2 → D3 → D4) by resource agencies will determine if the adaptive response is a short-or long-term solution to an environmental legitimation crisis. The effectiveness of collaborative decision making, as an adaptive mechanism, will likely vary by resource agency and level of government (federal, state, local) .
Because the CSM is dynamic and late capitalist societies are crisis prone and dependent, we assume that even if natural resource agencies treat collaborative decision making as authentic, this will lead to other accumulation and legitimation crises. The main point is that the democratization of environmental decision making is evidence of state adaptability, not a viable solution to end all crises. For instance, Samuel Huntington (1975) , based on the work of J. O'Connor (1973) and Habermas, in a 1974 "Report on the Governability of Democracies" to the Trilateral Commission, argued that the cause of crises was an excess of demands being placed on the political administrative system due to increased citizen participation. Huntington argued that the solution to this crisis was to reduce demands on the political administrative system-for there to be less democracy rather than more. Arguably, an emphasis on collaborative decision making in natural resource management is more of a financial and time burden on resource agencies than if they returned to the NEPA participation or scientific expertise eras.
By presenting the natural resource management systems model and assessing the relationships between resource-dependent industries (EconS), natural resource agencies (PAS), citizen stakeholders (SCS), and public lands and waters (EcoS), we attempted to: first, assess the empirical import of the crisis systems model; second, support our contention that the democratization of environmental decision making illustrates the central role and adaptability of the state; third, demonstrate the relevance of a fourth systems crisis-environmental legitimation crisis; and fourth, illustrate the necessity of treating the EcoS as a fourth semiautonomous system. Although we focused on natural resource management, assessing the applicability of the crisis systems model to other federal governmental agencies and other levels of government would provide a more rigorous test of the validity and reliability of the model. Ultimately, however, if our current trajectory of human development leads to an ecological crisis of living space, concern about the four crises discussed in this article becomes moot.
NOTES
1. In a similar vein, Garrett Hardin (1993) discusses the CC-PP game, where costs are commonized (everyone pays for them) and profits are privatized (funneled into the hands of corporations). This game is harmful from a distributional standpoint; CC-PP is faulted for lack of equity and justice.
2. A defining feature of a truly global economy is a function of two interrelated processes. First, the pervasiveness of the capitalist mode of production disables and replaces all
